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INTRODUCTION

If an agreement between combining corporations has the essential
characteristics of a merger, the failure of the merging parties to follow
statutory procedures should not deprive third party creditors of re-
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lief. 1 To protect such third parties, courts have created the doctrine of
de facto merger.2 "[D]efacto merger occurs where one corporation is
absorbed by another, but without compliance with the statutory requirements for a merger."3 A similar result is obtained in the related
concept of consolidation. In a merger, one of the combining corporations absorbs the other, and continues to exist after the merger. However, in a consolidation, all of the combining corporations are
dissolved and lose their identity in a completely new corporate entity.
The new corporation then takes over the properties, powers, privileges, and liabilities of the constituent corporations.4
The significance of determining whether a merger or a de facto
merger occurs is that in either case the successor corporation becomes
liable for the debts of the predecessor corporation(s):
When a merger takes effect: ... all liabilities and obligations of each
domestic and foreign corporation and other entity that is a party to
the merger shall be allocated to one or more of the surviving or new
domestic or foreign corporations and other entities in the manner
5
set forth in the plan of merger ....
Similar language may be found in the laws of other states which have
adopted the Model Business Corporations Act.6
In 1979, the Texas Legislature added article 5.10(B) to the Texas
Business Corporations Act.7 The Bar Committee Comments accompanying the statute 8 attribute an intent to the statute that this comment will demonstrate overstated the legislative intent of the House
and Senate.9 As a result, courts and commentators have interpreted
the amendment as eliminating the de facto merger doctrine in Texas.' 0
1. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
2. See, e.g., Arnold Graphics Indus. v. Independent Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1985).
3. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
4. Freeman v. Hiznay, 36 A.2d 509, 511 (Pa. 1944).
5. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.art. 5.06(A)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
6. "When a merger takes effect: ... the surviving corporation has all liabilities of
each corporation party to the merger .... " MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr
§ 11.06(a)(3) (1991).
7. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.art. 5.10 (West 1980).
8. Id. art. 5.10 cmt. of the Bar Committee - 1957 to 1979. "The 1979 amendment
added Article 5.10(B), the purpose of which is to preclude the application of de facto
merger in any sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all the
property and assets of a corporation requiring authorization under Article 5.10(A)."
Id.
9. See discussion infra pp. 602-15.
10. See, e.g., Aguirre v. Armstrong World Indus., 901 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir.
1990); Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Castilla v. Trinity Indus., 626 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd).
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Thus, courts have mistakenly interpreted the statute more broadly
than the Texas Legislature intended.
This comment examines three issues of Texas de facto merger law.
First, whether the Texas Legislature's 1979 amendment to Article 5.10
of the Texas Business Corporations Act was intended to eliminate the
de facto merger doctrine, regardless of how closely a transaction resembles a merger. Second, whether the 1987 and 1991 amendments to
Article 5.10 are additional evidence of a legislative intent to eliminate
the de facto merger doctrine. And, if so, whether it was sound public
policy to completely eliminate the de facto merger doctrine.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE DE FACTO MERGER DOCTRINE IN TEXAS

Generally, the "mere sale" of a corporation's assets does not make
the purchaser liable for pre-existing liabilities of the seller that are not
expressly assumed." There are, however, certain exceptions to this
rule:
Liability for obligations of a selling corporation may be imposed on
the purchasing corporation when (1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such obligations; (2) the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or merger of the selling corporation with
or into the purchasing corporation; (3) the purchasing corporation is
merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction is entered
into fraudulently to escape liability for such
12
obligations.
In order to deem a particular corporate transaction a de facto merger
courts look beyond the agreements of the corporate parties to determine if the characteristics of a merger exist. 13 These characteristics
are as follows:
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which results from the
purchasing corporation for the acquired assets with shares of its
own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a constituent part
of the purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations,
liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted contin14
uation of normal business operations of the seller corporation.
11. Knapp, 506 F.2d

12. Id. at 363-64.

at 363.

13. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. 1958).
14. Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d
98, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), aff'd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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In 1977, Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt5 presented
the most significant test to date of the de facto merger doctrine in
Texas.
A.

Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt

In Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt, the Austin
Court of Appeals applied the de facto merger doctrine in an insurance
fraud case.' 6 The Austin court held that under the de facto merger
doctrine, Western Resources Life Insurance Company ("W. R. Life")
was the successor corporation to American Business and Commercial
Life Insurance Company ("ABC"). Thus, W. R. Life assumed the tort
liabilities of ABC." These liabilities included the judgment Gerhardt
obtained after proving that agents of ABC defrauded him prior to the
alleged merger of the two corporations.' 8
Predictably, W. R. Life argued that it had merely purchased the assets of ABC, but did not agree to accept ABC's contingent liabilities,
and therefore should not be held liable for the conduct of ABC's
agents prior to becoming agents of W. R. Life.' 9 To support its argument, W. R. Life relied on the purchase agreement between W. R.
Life and ABC. The agreement provided in part: 1) W. R. Life would
purchase all of ABC's assets with W. R. Life stock plus $25,000 in cash
to cover transaction costs; 2) ABC's management and agency force
would affiliate with W. R. Life; 3) W. R. Life's Board of Directors
would be increased from nine members to fifteen members, three of
the directors were to be ABC's former directors and six new directors
were to be designated by ABC; 4) ABC would dissolve after distributing the W. R. Life shares to ABC's shareholders; and 5) an express
provision that W. R. Life would not assume ABC's contingent
liabilities.2 °
In deciding that a de facto merger had occurred, the court looked
beyond the purchase agreement between the parties and applied the
four2 1part de facto merger test set forth in Shannon v. Samuel Langston
Co. The court acknowledged the general rule that "[wihen one corporation transfers or sells its assets to another corporation, the purchaser is not usually liable for the debts and liabilities of the
1972); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 132 (D.N.J.
1976).
15. 553 S.W.2d at 783.
16. Id. at 787.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 785.
20. Id.
21. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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transferor."22 However, the court examined the transaction and determined that each element of a de facto merger was present. 23 Specifically, the court found that (1) W. R Life continued the enterprise
of ABC by retaining ABC's management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations; (2) ABC's shareholders
merely exchanged their ABC shares for W. R. Life shares, thus maintaining a continuity of shareholders; (3) ABC ceased its ordinary independent business operations, liquidated, and dissolved; and (4) W.
R. Life assumed the liabilities and obligations of ABC that were necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of ABC's normal business
operations.24 Based upon these findings, the Austin Court of Appeals
held W. R. Life liable for the debts of ABC as if W. R. Life had been
the successor corporation in a statutory merger.25
B. Legislative Response to Gerhardt
In 1979, two years after Gerhardt, the Texas Legislature amended
the Texas Business Corporations Act adding section B to article
5.10.26 The Bar Committee Comments following the statute note that
22.
23.
24.
1974).
25.
26.

Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d at 786.
Id
Id.; see also Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich.

Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d at 786-87.
Section 5.10(B) reads:
B. A disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a
corporation requiring the special authorization of the shareholders of the
corporation under Section A of this article:
(1) is not considered to be a merger or consolidation pursuant to this Act
or otherwise; and
(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute, does not
make the acquiring corporation responsible or liable for any liability or obligation of the selling corporation that the acquiring corporation did not expressly assume.
TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.10(B) (West 1980).
The Comment also states in relevant part:
The 1979 amendment added Article 5.10.B., the purpose of which is to preclude the application of the doctrine of de facto merger in any sale, lease,
exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all of the property and
assets of a corporation requiring authorization under Article 5.10.A. Under
the de facto merger doctrine, as announced in Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ
ref'd [sic] n.r.e.), an acquiring corporation can be held responsible for all
liabilities of a selling corporation notwithstanding the absence of a contractual agreement to assume such liabilities or even if such assumption is contractually negated. The new statutory provision provides that the acquiring
corporation in a purchase of assets transaction does not assume or otherwise
become liable for liabilities of the corporation whose assets are purchased,
unless the acquiring corporation agrees contractually to assume or become
liable for such liabilities. However, by expressly excepting from the operation of section B the effect of "any other statute of this State," the statutory
liabilities of an acquiring corporation under the bulk sales or fraudulent conveyances laws or similar statutes are left intact.
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"the purpose [of Article 5.10(B)] is to preclude the application of the
doctrine of de facto merger in any sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets of a corporation requiring authorization under Article 5.10.A. ' '27 These official
comments specifically refer to application of the de facto merger in
Gerhardt.z8
Texas courts have subsequently interpreted Article 5.10(B) as a
negative legislative response to Gerhardt.2 9 Additionally, authors
writing on successor liability have parroted the language of these official comments, stating broadly that "[tihe purpose of the 1979 amendment was to preclude the application of the doctrine of de facto
merger in any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation. ' 30 Since then, these Bar
Committee Comments have effectively become the law and de facto
merger has been widely disregarded.3 '
II.

ANALYSIS OF TEXAS ARTICLE

5.10(B)

A. Approaches to Statutory Construction
To determine the legislative intent of Article 5.10(B), it is first necessary to review the methods of statutory construction. Legislative
intent is generally determined by utilizing three principle approaches:
1) the plain meaning, or textual, approach; 2) the evolutive, or context
approach; and 3) the historical, legislative intent, or legal process approach.32 It should be kept in mind that statutory interpretation inTEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.10 cmt. of the Bar Committee-1957 to 1979 (West

1980).
27. Id. art. 5.10 crnt. of the Bar Committee-1957 to 1979 (West 1980).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Aguirre v. Armstrong World Indus., 901 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir.
1990); Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Castilla v. Trinity Indus., 626 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd).
30. James Ryan & Robert Beasley, Asset Acquisitions: Caveat Emptor, 53 TEX.
B.J. 1222, 1222 (1990).
31. Id.
32. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1483 (1987); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to
Resolve the Dispute Over the Meaning of the Term "Plan" in FederalRule of Evidence
404(B), 43 KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1034-36 (1995); David J. Jesulaitis, Lien Stripping After
Nobelman v. American Savings Bank: What is "AdditionalCollateral?," 32 Hous. L.
REV. 201, 210-11 (1995). Each of these authors uses slightly different nomenclature to
describe the three traditional approaches to statutory construction. Professor Eskridge argues for a fourth methodology which he calls dynamic statutory interpretation. Dynamic statutory interpretation is a broad based context approach that
considers not only the surrounding text and related sections of the statute itself, but
also the changes in the entire socio-economic-legal environment in which the statute
is applied in the instant case compared with the socio-economic-legal environment
that existed at the time the statute was passed.
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volves the present day interpreter's understanding and reconciliation
of the three different perspectives, not one of which necessarily controls.33 Applying these approaches will shed new light on the legislative intent of 5.10(B).
1. Plain Meaning
Rules of statutory interpretation require that statutes enacted by
the legislative majority be given effect and that individuals be given
notice of the rules governing their behavior. 34 This notice requirement suggests two things. First, that legislative intent is irrelevant and
that citizens are entitled to act in accordance with the plain meaning
of a statute regardless of what the legislators intended. Second, that
the statute itself states the intent of the law without requiring an individual to second guess legislative intent. This plain meaning, or textual approach, is based upon the reasoning that words should, not
surprisingly, be interpreted according to their plain meaning.35 Therefore, the language of a statute should provide the best, and some argue only, evidence of legislative intent.36
Statutory text certainly serves to limit the range of interpretive options available.37 When statutory text clearly answers the interpretive
question it should be the most important consideration.38 If a statute
can be read without ambiguity in a plain language jurisdiction, courts
should look no further than the plain meaning of the words. 39 However, exceptions to this exist "because an apparently clear text can be
rendered ambiguous by a demonstration of contrary legislative expectations or highly unreasonable consequences. '4° Thus, when plain
language fails to clearly answer the question, or when some other evidence suggests an alternative interpretation, courts should look to
context and legislative process for additional evidence of legislative
intent.
2. Context
The context approach considers the text in question as part of a
whole statutory scheme.4 This approach is often used when two provisions of a statute are in conflict. In these instances, the general rule
is to interpret each provision in order to avoid conflict. 2 Professor
Eskridge further urges an interpreter to consider not only the sur33. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1483.
34. Id.
35. Jesulaitus, supra note 32, at 211.

36. Id.
37. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1483.
38. Id.
39. Jesulaitus, supra note 32, at 211.
40. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1483.
41. Jesulaitus, supra note 32, at 211.
42. Id. at 211-12.
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rounding text, other parts of the statute and related statutes, but also
the evolution of the societal and legal environment over time to see if
the meaning of the statute has materially changed.4 3 Professor Eskridge considers the context approach, which he calls the evolutive
approach, to be the most important approach when the statutory text
is not clear and original legislative expectations have been overtaken
by subsequent changes in society and law."
Moreover, Professor Imwinkelreid reminds us that federal courts
have resisted efforts to read statutory language in isolation, torn from
context, and that ignoring context is a formula for disaster. 45 Imwinkelreid urges that the corpus of law is to be a "seamless web," and
"courts must ensure the coherence of the related legal norms, both
46
adjectival and substantive.
3. Historical or Legislative Process
Scholars and judges agree that the historical perspective, also
known as the legal process or legislative intent approach, is another
important interpretive consideration.47 There is general agreement
that "given the traditional assumptions that the legislature is the
supreme lawmaking body in a democracy, the historical expectations
of the enacting legislature are entitled to deference. ' 48 However,
there is little agreement on the weight to be given to the various extratextual materials that may shed light on legislative intent. Usually,
courts use the legislative intent approach when the statute is ambiguous or when the plain meaning approach would lead to absurd
results.49
Texas rules of statutory construction require courts to go beyond
the plain language of the statute and ascertain legislative intent.50
Moreover, once determined, legislative intent must be enforced by
courts even though the intent may not be entirely consistent with the
strict letter of the statute. 5 '
Before evaluating the legislative intent of 5.10(B), courts should
take note of Professor Imwinkelreid's warning that the past decade
has witnessed a fundamental change in the approach to statutory in43. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1483.
44. Id.
45. Imwinkelried, supra note 32, at 1035.

46. Id. at 1036.
47. See, e.g., Jesulaitus, supra note 32, at 211-12; Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1483;
Imwinkelried, supra note 32, at 1483; Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
48. Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1483.
49. Jesulaitus, supra note 32, at 212.
50. Dillehey, 815 S.W.2d at 625; Patterson,769 S.W.2d at 940 ("most common [rule
of statutory construction] ... is for the judiciary to attempt to effectuate the intent of
the Legislature").

51. Dillehey, 815 S.W.2d at 625.
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terpretation, particularly in federal court. Until recently, the dominant tradition has been the legal process approach.52 However,
looking at legislative intent may prove problematic if legislative history materials are allowed to trump the plain meaning of a text.53
The legislative intent approach has been criticized recognizing that
legislation is a product of compromise shaped by expediency. 54 Generally, legislation is passed after a relatively small number of legislators determine the wisdom and language of a particular statute
through a series of committee and subcommittee meetings. However,
the whole legislative body has only outcomes [plain language] upon
which they must cast their all or nothing vote. 55
At least one commentator has observed that, while there may be a
committee report, the vast majority of legislators casting votes approving a statute have no idea of a committee report's contents. 56
While that observation may not always hold true, it is fair to say the
majority of legislators are not always familiar with the committee debates and compromises shaping the final language of a particular bill.
Additionally, reports may have been drafted largely by special interest
groups who are seeking to influence courts construing the statute.57
Moreover, the particular phrasing of a report could add to, change, or
shade the meaning of a particular statute in such a way that it could
not have otherwise gained victory on the legislative floor.
Keeping these thoughts in mind, legislation should be viewed as a
carefully negotiated contract between competing special interest
groups. Therefore, legislation simply memorializes the end result of a
negotiation process. Thus, if extra-textual materials are later interpreted liberally by courts or commentators, legislators who carefully
consider the final wording of a particular statute, and base their votes
52. Imwinkelried, supra note 32, at 1034.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Imwinkelried, supra note 32, at 1034-35. This is precisely the circumstance
behind the enactment of article 5.10(B) and its subsequent amendments. The original
5.10(B) was drafted by the Committee on Revision of Corporation Law of the Banking and Business Law Section of the State Bar of Texas. The 1987 amendment was
drafted by the Texas Business Corporation Section of the State Bar. Finally, the 1991
amendment was drafted by the Texas Business Law Foundation, a group composed of
corporations, attorneys and professors. In each of these years, the Texas Legislature
passed these bills on recommendations of expert witnesses from the Bar. In at least
one meeting, a lay committee member frankly admitted that the legislation was too
technical for him to understand and that he was relying entirely on the expert's recommendations. See An Act Relating to Disposition of CorporateAssets, Derivative
Suits Against a CorporateMerger: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 142 Before the Senate Committee on Jurisprudence, 66th Leg., R.S. Tape (Feb. 6, 1979) (transcript on file with
Texas Wesleyan Law Review); An Act Relating to the Authority and Operation of Certain Business Organizations Which Provide for Limited Liability, Hearings on Tex.
H.B. 278 Before the House Business and Commerce Comm., 72nd Leg., R.S. Tape
(Mar. 11, 1991) (tape on file with Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
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on its plain language, may find they voted for a law that they strongly
opposed. Interpreting legislative intent should, therefore, be a conservative undertaking that seeks to clarify the plain language, without
contradicting it, or expanding it. This raises the question as to why the
plain language of Article 5.10(B) has become secondary to its Bar
Committee Comments.
B. Evidence of the Legislative Intent of Article 5.10(B)
The legislative intent of Article 5.10(B), and its amendments, were
ascertained from a comprehensive review of the available extra-textual material showing the context and legislative process leading to
passage of the statute.58
Article 5.10(B) began in the House as H.B. 387 with a companion
bill, S.B. 142.59 The Senate and House Bills were not materially different with respect to 5.10(B). Senator Ogg first introduced S.B. 142 in
January 1979, at which time it was referred to the Senate Committee
on Jurisprudence. The Committee on Jurisprudence then referred the
bill to the Subcommittee on Civil Matters. The text of the original bill
provided no additional evidence of legislative intent since there were
no material differences between the original text of the bill and the
final text of the statute. In addition to appending Section B to article
5.10, S.B. 142 amended other parts of the Texas Business Corporations Act as well. However, these amendments were not related to
the de facto merger doctrine and are beyond the scope of this article.
The Subcommittee on Civil Matters heard S.B. 142 on January 30,
1979, when Senator Ogg again introduced the bill.6" Senator Ogg's
58. The material reviewed included: 1) the text of House Bill H.B. 387 and companion S.B. 142 of the 66th Legislature; 2) the transcript of the Senate Hearing held
April 23, 1979 at which the Senate passed S.B. 142; 3) the transcript of the Senate
Jurisprudence Committee Hearing on S.B. 142, February 6, 1979; 4) the transcript of
the House Business and Commerce Committee Hearing, February 5, 1979; 5) Transcript of the House Business and Commerce Committee Hearing, February 26, 1979;
6) the House Study Group Bill Analysis; and 7) the House Business and Commerce
Committee Bill Analysis. Evidence of legislative intent of the 1987 and 1991 amendments comes from: 1) the Senate Economic Development Committee Hearing, H.B.
418, April 24, 1987; 2) the House Business and Commerce Committee Hearing, H.B.
278, February 25, 1991; and 3) the House Business and Commerce Committee Bill
Analysis, H.B. 278.
59. Tex. S.B. 142, 66th Leg., R.S. (1979) was the Senate version of the bill that
eventually became 5.10(B).
60. The Disposition of Assets of a Corporation and Certain Corporate Mergers:
Hearings on Tex. S.B. 142 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Civil Matters, 66th Leg.,
R.S. Tape (Jan. 30, 1979) [hereinafter Tape of Senate Subcomm. on Civil Matters]
(transcript on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
Ogg: [An Austin court of appeals case applied] "the old common law doctrine of de
facto merger"-"that is if you buy an asset of a corporation you really in effect merge
the two corporations and you take on all the hidden liabilities of the corporation even
though you may have only bought just one asset

. .

. " now this bill would allow a

corporation to statutorily purchase those assets.., they would have to comply with
other protections such as the bulk sales act and the other protections ....
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introduction, however, misinterpreted the Gerhardt decision.61 Ogg
told the Subcommittee that merely purchasing a single asset from a
corporation would make the purchaser liable for hidden liabilities of
the seller, and that legislation was needed to prevent this "old common law" doctrine from producing such unfair results. 62 Ogg also assured the Subcommittee that creditor protection provided under bulk
sales law would not be impaired.63
The Subcommittee then heard testimony in support of the bill from
Mr. Boone of the State Bar of Texas.' Mr. Boone told the committee
"notwithstanding the fact that the court found that the [W. R. Life]
transaction had complied with article 5.10(A), the corporation was required to assume the liabilities of [the seller]. 65 Mr. Boone supported Senator Ogg's position that the Gerhardtdecision necessitated
passage of S.B. 142 thereby amending article 5.10. 66
However, Mr. Boone made no mention of the various necessary
factual elements used by the Gerhardtcourt to determine that a transaction is a de facto merger. 67 Mr. Boone made no mention of the fact
the court acknowledged the general rule that a mere purchase of assets alone does not make a purchaser liable for the debts of a seller.68
Further, Mr. Boone added facts to the Gerhardtdecision by stating the
court found "compliance with 5.10(A)," and notwithstanding that
compliance, found a de facto merger had indeed occurred. 69 Apparently, relying on Mr. Boone's and Senator Ogg's interpretation of
Gerhardt,together with the plain language of the bill, the Subcommittee favorably reported the bill back to the full Senate Jurisprudence
Committee.
Senator Ogg then presented S.B. 142 to the full Senate Committee
on Jurisprudence, stating "[i]t has to do with the doctrine of de facto
merger of corporations. And there is a lawsuit that this legislation is
attempting to cure .... - 7o Senator Ogg represented to the Committee
Id.
61. Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. Tape of Senate Subcomm. on Civil Matters, supra note 60.
63. Id
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. An Act Relating to Disposition of CorporateAssets, Derivative Suits Against a
Corporate Merger: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 142 Before the Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, 66th Leg., R.S. Tape (Feb. 6, 1979) [hereinafter Tape of Senate Jurisprudence
Comm.] (transcript on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
68. Gerhardt,553 S.W.2d at 786.
69. Tape of Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence,supra note 67.
70. Tape of Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence,supra note 67.
Chairman: At this time, the chair will lay out Senate Bill 142 which has been
reported from the Subcommittee on Civil Matters and recognize Senator
Ogg.
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that "if you buy a corporation [under Gerhardt] it can be considered a
merger and can leave you opened to [a lawsuit]."'"
However, Senator Ogg's introductory remarks to the Jurisprudence
Committee did not set forth the elements required for determining a
de facto merger, and thereby misstated the nature of the problem that
the legislation was intended to cure. Senator Ogg told the Committee
the bill had the support of the State Bar and there was no objection to
the bill. 72 Moreover, no one asked questions, and the entire procedure lasted only two or three minutes. The Committee then passed
the bill to the full Senate with recommendation for passage.73
The full Senate considered S.B. 142 on April 23, 1979, which Senator Ogg again introduced.74 The transcript of the reading indicates the
Ogg: Mr. Chairman and members, this is a bill that came out of Senator
Braeckleins' Civil Jurisprudence Subcommittee last week. It has to do with
the doctrine of de facto merger [sic] of corporations. And there is a law suit
that ah - this legislation is attempting to cure and it is a situation where if a
derivative suit lies, if you have a merger that you don't, in fact, the merging
corporation doesn't buy that law suit, under the present case law, there is a
case where that is allowed and if you buy a corporation it is considered, it
can be considered a merger and can leave you open to that.
Now Senator Doggett and I ah - have talked about another bill that he has
that represents, that would in affect [sic] let creditors do the same thing.
And I think what we're going to try to do, if the committee is willing, is to go
ahead and get this bill passed out as a vehicle and hopefully within two
weeks we're going to see if we can merge these two bills. This bill as it is
before this committee is a bill that comes from a section of the State Bar
Association and I know of no opposition to it, there hasn't been any, nor do
we know of any.
Chairman: Are there questions of Senator Ogg? If not, are there anyone, is
there anyone who desires to testify for or against Senate Bill 142? If, ah Senator Doggett moves that Senate Bill 142 be reported back to the Senate
with a favorable recommendation that it do pass and be printed. All those in
favor say aye, those opposed say nay. Secretary call the roll.
Secretary: (Roll Call)
Chairman: There being 7 votes for and no votes against, Senate Bill 142 will
be so reported.
Ogg: Mr. Chairman, just so I didn't misstate anything, I think ah - Senator
Doggett may, we may try to use that plan or he may want to bring his own
bill out and we'll have both bills and try to merge it. But, under whatever,
plan, we're trying to work those two together if we can.
(End of discussion of S.B. 142).
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Debate on Tex. S.B. 142 on the floor of the Senate, 66th Leg., R.S. Tape 1, side
1 (Apr. 23, 1979) (transcript on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
President: The Senator from Harris, Senator Ogg.
Ogg: Members, I would like to bring up out of its regular order, Senate Bill
142, and ask that the, that all rules be suspended. That is a rule that involved
derivative lawsuits, de facto [sic] mergers in derivative law suits that Senator
Schwartz and I discussed early in the Session. We have amended the section
that Senator Schwartz objected to and have take [sic] it totally out of the bill
and as far as I know, now there is no objection to it.
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discussion was extremely short and again misrepresented Gerhardt's
reasoning and the nature of the de facto merger doctrine.75 When
Senator Patman asked Senator Ogg why the bill was necessary, Senator Ogg stated it was necessary to prevent the purchase of corporate
assets from being deemed a de facto merger by a court.7 6 Senator

Ogg's explanation of the bill's necessity again implied that the
Patman: Will the Senator yield for a question? Okay. What, what does the
bill do then? Would you refresh our memory about it?
Ogg: This the one relating to de facto [sic] merger and as we... Well, it says
that, that in effect if you have a, if you purchase corporate assets, that it does
not amount to a de facto [sic] merger. That the creditors have all their ordinary rights that they have under the present law, including criminal rights,
Senator, including the rights of bankruptcy, including those things.
Patman: Alright.
Ogg: We took out the part about the derivative lawsuit.
Patman: Just for the history of this thing, there is no intention that will deprive anybody of any right... that he present [sic] has.., under this.
Ogg: No. Of course not.
Patman: Thank you.
President: The Senator from Harris ask [sic] unanimous consent to take up
Senate Bill 142. Is there objection? Chair hears none, lay out Senate Bill
142 on second reading. Secretary read caption.
Secretary: Senate Bill 142 relating to disposition of assets of a corporation.
(Amendment entered striking section 2 of the bill and renumbering subsequent sections accordingly)
President: (After adoption of the amendment). The chair lays out Senate
Bill 152 [sic] [142] on third reading and final passage, Secretary read the
caption.
Secretary: Senate Bill 142 relating to disposition of assets of a corporation.
President: The Senator yields.
Patman: Senator, just a couple of other questions. Will this bill be amended
in the House to put back in what Senator Schwartz and I objected to?
Ogg: Well as far as I'm concerned, Senator, we have a, you know, that's
the-situation we're in and I don't intend to try to do that.
Patman: Alright. Second question, what is the need for the bill?
Ogg: Because of a lawsuit, Senator, let me get you the style of it. There was
a lawsuit, Western Reserve Life Insurance Company versus Gerhardt, that
came out of the Austin Court where in a purchase was held to be a de facto
[sic] merger and that's what this attempts to do is keep it from being a de
facto [sic] merger. And it statutorily clears up the problem that that lawsuit
created.
Patman: All right, if it is a de facto merger [sic], what happens to the rights
of the parties?
Ogg: If it is not a de facto merger [sic], they're just as they are now. If it in
fact, would be a de facto [sic] merger then, someone coming in purchasing
the assets of a corporation, a third party would also be subject to the creditor
and it would give creditors new rights. That [sic] what, what a de facto [sic]
merger would do and what this attempts to do is keep both parties in their
place.
Patman: Thank you.
(Roll Call - S.B. 142 Passes).
Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Gerhardt court had found a mere purchase of assets to be a de facto
merger.
Looking next at the material from the House of Representatives,
there is no evidence the majority of the House intended to statutorily
overturn Gerhardt. After the House sent the matter to the House
Committee on Business and Industry, the Committee held its first
hearing on H.B. 387 and companion S.B. 142 on February 5, 1979.
Representative Danny Hill, H.B. 387's sponsor, introduced the bill
and referred to "the material that is in front of you."' 77 Representative
Hill then turned the presentation over to Mr. Boone of the State
Bar.78 No further description of the material was given on tape, but
the material in the Bill File dated on or before February 5, 1979 includes only the text of the bill.
Mr. Boone's opening remarks were essentially the same as those he
made to the Senate Subcommittee on Civil Matters. 79 However, there
was additional discussion as Representative Allee questioned Mr.
Boone extensively
regarding the substance and reasoning of
80
Gerhardt.

The bill was then referred to subcommittee, however, there is no
tape or transcript of the subcommittee hearing. H.B. 387 was reported back from subcommittee on February 26, 1979 along with a
report.8 1 There was no further debate at the February 26, 1979 hearing and the bill was recommended to the House floor for passage.
77. An Act Relating to Disposition of CorporateAssets, Derivative Suits, and Certain CorporateMergers: Hearings on Tex. H.B. 387 Before the House Committee on
Business and Industry, 66th Leg., R.S. Tape (Feb. 5, 1979) [hereinafter Tape of the
House Bus. & Ind. Comm.] (transcript on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. In the exchange between Mr. Boone and Mr. Allee, Mr. Allee pointed out the
essential elements that Gerhardt used to determine a de facto merger. Mr. Allee further questioned whether any further legislation was necessary in light of the fact that
a mere purchase of assets would not be a defacto merger. Mr. Boone did not directly
respond to Mr. Allee's questions but generally argued that legislation was needed to
assure that 5.10(A) would not be interpreted by future courts as a de facto merger
given the fact that Gerhardthad recognized the de facto merger doctrine for the first
time in Texas. Mr. Boone repeatedly illustrated his argument with the example that a
purchase of $1,000 worth of assets could carry with it the purchase of $1,000,000 worth
of unexpected liabilities. Mr. Boone pointed out that this was not fair and would
prevent mom and pop from being able to sell their corner drug store. Mr. Boone also
pointed out that bulk transfer, fraudulent conveyance, and securities fraud would be
adequate to protect creditors from abuse. Id.
81. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS.

AND INDUS., BILL ANALYSIS,

Tex. S.B. 142,66th Leg.,

R.S. (1979). On the tape there is no substantive discussion and the bill was passed
after a cursory introduction with the recommendation "do pass." Tape of the House
Bus. & Ind. Comm., supra note 77.
Background Information The first and most substantive amendment conterns ARTICLE 5.10.A of the TBCA which governs the sale of "all or sub-

stantially all" of the assets of a Texas corporation. This statutory provision
does not require that the acquiring corporations assume or otherwise become liable for the liabilities of the corporation whose assets are purchased.
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There is no tape or transcript of the House floor debate on either
S.B. 142 or H.B. 387. There is no evidence that the House membership heard any comment or debate from anyone, including either Mr.
Boone or Mr. Allee. Therefore, the House membership appears to
have been provided with no more than the plain language of the final
bill and its two reports. The first report was the Bill Analysis of the
Business & Industry Committee, 82 and the second report was prepared by the House Study Group.83
In contrast, when there is a statutory merger (pursuant to ARTICLES 5.02
or 5.01 of the TBCA), ARTICLE 5.06 of the TBCA provides that the surviving corporation is liable for all obligations of the merged corporation. Due
to the statutory assumption of liabilities in a merger, purchasers often negotiate purchase of asset transactions pursuant to ARTICLE 5.10. A. in order
to avoid becoming liable for liabilities which are not contemplated by the
purchaser in negotiating the acquisition. However, under the de facto
merger doctrine, as announced in the recent case of Western Resources Life
Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt, an acquiring corporation pursuant to ARTICLE
5.10.A. can be held responsible for all liabilities of a selling corporation
notwithstanding the absence of a contractual agreement to assume such liabilities or even if such assumption is contractually negated. Thus certain inequities are imposed upon an acquiring corporation in such
circumstances ....
Purpose The purpose of SECTION 1 of this bill affecting ARTICLE 5.10B.
is to preclude or stop the application of the doctrine of de facto merger in
any sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of all or substantially all the
property and assets of a corporation requiring authorization under Article
5.10.A. However, by expressly excepting from the operation of section B.
the effect of "any other statute of this State", the statutory liabilities of an
acquiring corporation under the bulk sales or fraudulent conveyance laws or
similar statutes are left intact ...
Section by Section Analysis. Section 1: Amends Article 5.10, Texas Business Corporation Act, as amended, by adding a new Section B which precludes the doctrine of de facto merger in any sale, lease, exchange or other
disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets of a corporation
under Article 5.10.A. It further expressly excepts from Section B. the effect
of any other statute of this state. Thus,.the statutory liabilities of an acquiring corporation under the bulk sales or fraudulent conveyances laws are left
intact.
82. Id.
83. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUS., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 387, 66th Leg.,
R.S. (May 1, 1979).
Subject: Corporations
Committee: Business and Industry: favorable, with amendments
Vote: 9 Ayes - Semos, McCleod, Polumbo, Allee, Glossbrenner, A. Hill,
Lee, Robnett, Waters
0 nay
0 present, not voting
2 absent - Bush, S. Thompson
Witnesses: For - Michael Boone, State Bar of Texas
Against - None
Digest: This bill amends the [Texas] Business Corporations Act to make it
clear that the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a corporation with
shareholder approval shall not be considered a "de facto [sic] merger .... "
Pro: This bill makes it clear that the doctrine of "de facto [sic] merger" shall
not apply to the sale of corporate assets under the act. This will protect cor-
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C. Evidence of Legislative Intent from the 1987 and
1991 Amendments

Any analysis of legislative intent of article 5.10(B) would be incomplete without discussing the 1987 and 1991 amendments. If a statute
has been the subject of litigation, legislative amendments are presumed to have considered court decisions interpreting the statute. 84
Legislative amendments which construe or clarify prior statutes are
strong evidence of legislative declaration of a statute's original meaning," therefore, legislative amendments suggest ratification of prior
court decisions.
The 1991 amendment, enacted through H.B. 278, was proposed in
order to "conform the authorization requirements for a proposed sale
of substantially all the assets of a corporation to the authorization requirements for a merger or share exchange."86 The bill did not, however, purport to modify article 5.10 and makes no reference to any
cases regarding de facto merger. Thus, the 1991 amendment is not
further evidence of legislative intent to eliminate the de facto merger
doctrine.
porations who have acquired assets of another corporation in compliance
with the act from being saddled with unexpected and unknown liabilities of
the other corporation.
Con: No apparent opposition.
Commentary: The [Texas] Business Corporations Act covers both the
merger and disposition of corporate assets. These are two separate and distinct transactions and are covered by different rules and regulations.
A merger includes the merging of the property, assets, and stock of participating corporations. The surviving corporation inherits all of the liability of
the merged corporation. A corporation may also sell or otherwise dispose of
corporate property or assets, with shareholder approval. However, the acquiring corporation assumes only as much of the liabilities of the disposing
corporation as it contractually agrees to accept.
The doctrine of "defacto [sic] merger" has been used to hold that when
the terms of an acquisition of corporate assets so closely resemble the terms
of a merger that the transaction will be deemed a "defacto [sic] merger."
This makes the acquiring corporation liable for all of the debts of the disposing corporation, notwithstanding any contractual provisions to the contrary.
The doctrine has been done away with in most states, and it was thought that
the doctrine did not apply to the disposition of corporate assets under the
Texas [Business Corporation] Act. However, in Western Resources Life Ins.
Company v. Gerhardt,553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, 1977) the
court applied the doctrine of "defacto [sic] merger" to a transfer of corporate shares and assets. It prevented the corporations from avoiding liability
through corporate transformations or changes in form only. This bill makes
it clear that the disposition of corporate assets and property under the act is
not to be considered a "defacto [sic]
merger."
(Sections of the report not related to de facto merger have been omitted).
Id.
84. Sutherland Stat. Const. § 22.31 (5th ed. 1991).
85. Id.
86. HousE COMM. ON Bus. AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 278, 72nd
Leg., R.S. (1991).
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The 1987 amendment, however, requires a more detailed analysis.
H.B. 418, passed by the 70th Legislature, revised the language of article 5.10(B) by removing the phrase "or consolidation" from the enacted language.87 This is evidence of legislative intent, since the entire
sentence could have been deleted, but instead the prohibition against
deeming an article 5.10(A) transaction a merger was retained.88 Additionally, at the time of the amendment, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals refused to apply the de facto merger doctrine based on article
5.10(B).19 As previously noted, under the rules of statutory construction, any cases between 1979 and 1987 concerning de facto merger
were presumptively considered in enacting the amendment.'
However, this presumption is undermined on two counts. First,
case history is extremely short and mixed.9 ' Second, although the Bill
Analysis of H.B. 418 states that the legislative intent was to reaffirm
the preclusion of de facto merger, the hearing tapes and transcripts
make no mention of intervening cases nor any discussion or debate of
article 5.10's application since the time of its original amendment. 92
The focus of the testimony and discussion in 1987 was on H.B. 418's
provision allowing corporate directors to be indemnified for costs and
attorney's fees in derivative actions. 93 The de facto merger doctrine
was never discussed. Therefore, the 1987 amendment's evidentiary
value is minimal.
D. Applying the Rules of Statutory Construction to the Evidence of
Legislative Intent
1. The Plain Meaning Approach
The plain language of 5.10(B) is short and easily reduced to simple
terms. The plain language should therefore be considered as the first,
but not the only, evidence of legislative intent. Section 5.10(B) states:
87. House COMM.
Leg., R.S. (1987).

ON

Bus.

AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS,

Tex. H.B. 414, 70th

88. Id
89. See Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding summary judgment without an analysis of the transaction's characteristics, since de facto merger is statutorily precluded by article
5.10(B)).

90. Sutherland Stat. Const. § 22.31 (5th ed. 1991).

91. See Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (holding the facts did not constitute a de facto merger regardless of art.
5.10 (B)); but see Wall v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 602 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D.

Tex. 1985) (following Gerhardt,the court held a purchasing corporation cannot escape
the liability of the transferee if the transaction is tantamount to a merger).

92. An Act Relating to the Incorporation, Organization, Operation, Reorganization, and Dissolution of Certain Corporations-Providinga CriminalPenalty: Hearings
on Tex. H.B. 418 Before the House Comm. on Business and Commerce, 70th Leg., R.S.
Tape (March 23, 1987) (tape on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).

93. Id
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A disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of
a corporation requiring the special authorization of the shareholders of the corporation under Section A of this article:
(1) is not considered to be a merger or consolidation pursuant to
this Act or otherwise; and
(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute, does
not make the acquiring corporation responsible or liable for any liability or obligation of the selling cor9 oration that the acquiring corporation did not expressly assume.
In analyzing this language, it is first helpful to eliminate the contingent
clauses and parse the single compound sentence. If you do so, the
sentence becomes: A disposition of all of a corporation's property is
not a merger pursuant to this act or otherwise; and: A disposition of
all of a corporation's property does not make the acquiring corporation liable for the [debts] of the selling corporation. However, the
phrase or otherwise requires consideration of additional materials to
clarify its meaning. A review of these additional materials reveals that
or otherwise refers to the common law doctrine of de facto merger.95
Then, the parsed sentence becomes: A disposition of all of a corporation's property is not a merger pursuant to this act or pursuant to the
common law doctrine of de facto merger.
The extra-textual material is also consistent with the view that the
statute merely sought to clarify the status of transactions undertaken
pursuant to 5.10(A). As the House Committee on Business and Commerce Report states, "[t]his bill makes it clear that the doctrine of 'de
facto merger' shall not apply to the sale of corporate assets under the
act."' 96 Morever, clarifying certain rights and responsibilities of interested parties under 5.10(A) does not provide a basis to broadly interpret 5.10(B) as meaning that a de facto merger may not apply even
when all the additional facts and circumstances needed to find a de
facto merger are present in a transaction.
Having demonstrated the phrase or otherwise refers to de facto
merger, the plain langauge of the 1979 version of article 5.10(B) states
nothing more than that a purchase of substantially all of a corporation's assets is not by itself a merger and does not make the purchasing corporation liable for the debts of the selling corporation. Thus,
the plain language of article 5.10(B) did nothing more than codify the
common law rule that a mere purchase of corporate assets does not
constitute a merger and does not make the purchasing corporation
liable for the debts of the selling corporation. This is the same rule
used in jurisdictions recognizing de facto merger. 98 Thus, courts
94. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.art. 5.10(B) (West 1980).
95. See supra notes 77, 80 and accompanying text.
96. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND COMMERCE, Bill Analysis, supra note 83.
97. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
98. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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should find more than a mere purchase of assets to reach the conclusion that a de facto merger has occurred. 99 The plain language approach unambiguously allows the statute to be interpreted
consistently with the rule of law followed in jurisdictions recognizing
the de facto merger doctrine. But for the Texas rule, requiring further
inquiry into legislative intent, this analysis could stop with the plain
language of the statute.
2.

The Context Approach

Mr. Boone of the State Bar provided insight into the broader business and legal context of the State Bar's request for the amendment.
Although Mr. Boone did not testify before the full Senate or House,
his testimony before their subcommittees is illuminating. Mr. Boone
testified that Texas corporate lawyers customarily structure transactions with full knowledge that they have two alternative structures
from which to choose: 1) merger under section 5.06; or 2) sale of assets under Section 5.10(A). 100 Mr. Boone stated that moms and pops
typically sell corner drug stores in sale of asset transactions rather
than merger transactions because buyers do not want to assume liabilities beyond those bargained for.' 0 ' Boone also stated that if sale of
asset transactions could not be accomplished, then no one would
purchase mom and pop corner drug stores because purchasers would
be afraid of taking on hidden liabilities. 10 2 Furthermore, Mr. Boone
stated sale of asset transactions provide creditors protection under the
Bulk 3Sales Act, Fraudulent Conveyance Act, or securities fraud
0

law.1

The essence of Mr. Boone's testimony was incorporated into the
Business and Industry Committee Bill Analysis which was sent to the
House and Senate. The report states, "[d]ue to the statutory assumption of liabilities in a merger, purchasers often negotiate purchase of
asset transactions pursuant to ARTICLE 5.10 A in order to avoid becoming liable for liabilities which are not contemplated by the purchaser in negotiating the acquisition."' 10
Mr. Boone's testimony reflects policy considerations which are discussed later in this article. 0 5 His testimony also sheds light on 5.10
B's legislative intent. For example, Mr. Boone acknowledged the
need to prevent fraud or unfairness to creditors." ° Mr. Boone's ex99. Id. at 801. (To conclude de facto merger a court must find four factors, (1)
Continuation of the enterprise, (2) Continuity of shareholders, (3) Seller ceases its
ordinary business, (4) Purchaser assumes liabilities necessary for continuation.).
100. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See discussion infra pp. 615-26.
106. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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changes with Mr. Allee demonstrate that at least some members of
the committee recognized that Gerhardt found more than a mere
purchase of assets when it deemed the W. R. Life transaction a de
facto merger.1 "7 Mr. Allee clearly wanted assurance that when these
additional facts are present, the proposed legislation would not prevent their consideration in determining whether a merger occurs.
The legislation's context supports the view that the plain language
of section B was narrowly tailored to allow legitimate purchase of asset transactions to occur without being deemed de facto mergers.
However, this context does not justify the broader interpretation that
there is no de facto merger even when all the facts and circumstances
exceeding a sale of assets are present.
One final comment is justified. Neither Mr. Boone nor the Committee Report distinguishes between a transaction in which corporate
assets are sold to a stranger who remains a stranger after a cash transaction, and a transaction in which former shareholders, directors, and
officers of the selling corporation become part of the purchasing corporation, thus retaining control of the assets and an ownership interest
in the future income generated after the transfer. This is an important
evidentiary consideration which should not be overlooked in evaluating legislative intent of 5.10(B).
3. The Legislative Process Approach
The last step in determining whether the Legislature intended to
exceed the plain language of 5.10(B) requires examination of the
mechanics of the legislative process leading to its enactment. This
raises the question whether there was any debate or extra-textual material that the House and Senate were provided evidencing their intent to go beyond the plain language of the bill before them.
Remembering the possibility that special interest groups operate to
influence legislation, we should look at whether the extra-textual material provided to the House and Senate membership was misleading,
causing members to vote for a bill they otherwise may not have
supported.
To become law in Texas, a bill must pass the House and Senate by
majority vote and then be signed into law by the Governor."0 To find
legislative intent beyond the plain language of a statute requires not
only evidence of what one small group of legislators or outside witnesses intended, but clear evidence of what the majority of the House
and Senate intended. Thus, to form intent beyond the plain language
of a statute presumes that the majority actually considered or debated
the material alleged to evidence the extra-textual intent.
107. Id
108. TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
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In this instance, there is no evidence of any debate on the House
floor. The absence of debate must be interpreted as an absence of
extra-textual intent. Any other interpretation requires speculation
whenever a statute is relevant to determining an issue.
The only evidence of extra-textual intent comes from the reports
contained in the Bill File. It is reasonable to assume that the House
membership relied on these reports and voted for the bill accordingly.
Given the contents of the reports, the resulting legislation should be
interpreted to intend a cure for the problem set forth in the reports
and no more. Yet, the Study Group Report states, "[t]his bill makes it
clear that the doctrine of 'de facto merger' shall not apply to the sale
of corporate assets under the act."' 9 This language can not be interpreted as a broad rejection of the de facto merger doctrine. The language should more appropriately be interpreted as clarification of the
effect of an article 5.10 transaction.
After reviewing the House Study Group Bill Analysis, it is apparent
that the members of the House were provided with a report favorably
recommending the bill, but at the same time fundamentally misrepresenting the findings, reasoning, and holding of Gerhardt. The report
states, "[t]he doctrine of 'de facto merger' has been used to hold that
the terms of an acquisition of corporate assets so closely resemble the
terms of a merger that the transaction will be deemed a 'de facto
merger.""' 0 This was not the Gerhardtholding.
The general rule of de facto merger, announced in Gerhardt,is that
if the terms of an acquisition of corporate assets so closely resembles
the terms of a merger, then the transaction will be deemed a de facto
merger."' Thus, deeming a particular transaction a de facto merger
depends entirely on finding other facts and circumstances regarding
the transaction. Therefore, the Study Group Report had the capacity
to mislead the House members into believing that a mere acquisition
of corporate assets under 5.10(A) by itself was deemed a de facto
merger by the Gerhardt court.
This view is further supported by examing the Business and Industry Committee's Bill Analysis. That report also misinterprets the reasoning and holding of Gerhardt,and wrongly advised the House:
[U]nder the de facto merger doctrine, as announced in the recent
case of Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v. Gerhardt,an acquiring corporation pursuant to ARTICLE 5.10 A. can be held responsible for all liabilities of a selling corporation notwithstanding the
absence of a contractual agreement to assume such liabilities or
even if such assumption is contractually negated. Thus certain ineq-

109. HousE COMM. ON BUS. AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 83.
110. Id.
111. See Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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uities are imposed
upon an acquiring corporation in such
2
circumstances.1
Gerhardt simply did not reach such a conclusion and, in fact, never
mentioned Article 5.10(A). Furthermore, Gerhardtexplicitly rejected
the notion that 1a3 purchase of corporate assets by itself imposes liability on a buyer.1
The Business and Commerce Report then advised the House membership that "[t]his statutory provision does not require that the acquiring corporations assume or otherwise become liable for the
liabilities of the corporation whose assets are purchased.""' 4 Again,
this language only clarifies Article 5.10 A's intent. A purchase of assets does not by itself carry with it the debts of the selling corporation.
It should be noted that the Business and Commerce Committee Report was the only report in S.B. 142's Bill File. The House Study
on the matter, and
Group Report is dated after the full Senate hearing
5
therefore, was not considered by the Senate."1
Furthermore, there was a brief discussion between Senator Ogg and
Senator Patman immediately before the vote. Senator Patman specifically asked Senator Ogg for assurances that no one would be deprived of any rights by the legislation. 116 The legislative intent must,
therefore, be evaluated in light of the Senate's intent not to deprive
anyone of their rights. Substantive law necessarily changes, and thus
potentially deprives individuals of rights. Therefore, Article 5.10(B)
may not be interpreted to change or deprive contingent creditors of
any right of recovery from successor corporations where the elements
of a de facto merger are present. Rather, 5.10(B) must be interpreted
as a clarification of 5.10(A).
The Committee Reports and Mr. Ogg's statements to the Senate
also assured the Senate that other statutes were adequate to protect
creditors in the event of fraudulent or bulk transfers of assets."17 As
demonstrated below, fraudulent and bulk transfer law, although intended to protect creditors in corporate transfers, have numerous8
holes which leave contingent creditors vulnerable to injustices."
Prior to this legislation, creditors clearly had a right to recover the
value of a judgment from corporate assets transferred in a true de
facto merger. But interpreting 5.10(B) in such a way as to statutorily
eliminate de facto merger in all circumstances deprives contingent
creditors of their right to recover such judgments from corporate as112.

HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS,

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Gerhardt,553 S.W.2d at 786-87.

supra note 86.

supra note 86.
Id.
Debate on Tex. S.B. 142 on the floor of the Senate, supra note 74.
Id.
See infra pp. 619-23.
HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS,
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sets. Such an interpretation, therefore, goes against the legislative intent that creditors not be deprived of their existing rights.
In summary, the available extra-textual evidence is not sufficient to
establish that the Legislature intended to preclude de facto merger
when all of its elements are present. The remaining section of this
comment examines policy considerations which further demonstrate
that elimination of the de facto merger doctrine creates opportunities
to defraud Texas contingent creditors. To argue the 66th Legislature
intended to create such opportunities would lead to absurd results
contradictory to the principles of statutory interpretation. 19 On the
other hand, interpreting 5.10(B) as a clarification, strictly in accordance with its plain language, creates no absurd results and the statute
should be so interpreted as such.
III.

A.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

General Considerationsand Identity of the Parties

Corporate organization has evolved for the purpose of taking on
large scale activities beyond the economic means of the individual.
Corporate law has since developed two central concepts. One is that
the corporation, not the individual stock holders, enters into transactions with respect to the acquisition or disposition of corporate assets. 120 The other is that the corporation, not the individual stock
holders, are liable for corporate debts.' 2 ' Thus, creditors have limited
recourse for recovery of debts against individual shareholders,
officers, directors and employees.
Limited liability allows, and thereby encourages, business owners to
engage in economic activity knowing their financial risk is limited to
the amount of their capital contributions and retained earnings in the
face of changing and unpredictable circumstances. Therefore, if a cor-'
porate enterprise does not generate adequate income to pay its expenses, corporate assets are exhausted, and the stockholder loses his
investment, but no more.
However, shielding individual corporate owners from personal liability for corporate debt creates the potential for creditor abuse by
corporate insiders. Creditors are abused when insiders transfer corporate assets, either to themselves or to other corporate entities they
control, and fail to pay the corporation's current creditors or fail to
make provisions to pay contingent creditors. Both the assets and income generated by the transferred assets become unavailable to creditors, absent some legal remedy allowing them to recover from either
the transferor or the transferee.
119. Jesulaitus, supra note 32, at 212.
120. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.02 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
121. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.21 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
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When use of the corporate form of business organization first became widespread, it was relatively easy for courts to define a
'merger' or a 'sale of assets' and to label a particular transaction as
one or the other. But prompted by both the desire to avoid the impact of adverse, and obtain the benefits of favorable, government
regulations, particularly federal tax laws, new accounting and legal
techniques were developed by lawyers and accountants which interwove the elements characteristic of each, thereby creating hybrid
forms of corporate amalgamation. Thus, it is no longer helpful to
consider an individual transaction in the abstract and solely by reference to the various elements therein determine whether it is a
'merger' or a 'sale'. Instead, to determine properly the nature of a
corporate transaction, we must refer not only to all the provisions of
the agreement, but also to the consequences of the transaction and
to the purposes
of the provisions of the corporation law said to be
122
applicable.
De facto merger is an equitable creditor's remedy, and there obviously is substantial dispute as to whether that remedy should be available to Texas creditors. 12 3 Texas enjoys a reputation for being friendly
to debtors largely due to its liberal homestead and personal property
exemptions. 1 24 While Texas may be generous in allowing individuals a
fresh start when their economic circumstances have become hopeless,
Texas law seeks to prevent outright fraud against creditors. 2 5 Texas
law also seeks to protect those who purchase corporate assets in good
faith for reasonable value, commonly known as bona fide purchasers
("BFPs"). 126 This protection is accomplished by providing defenses
and other relief to BFPs if the subject property is claimed by a former
12 7
owner's undisclosed creditor.
To more closely examine the policy behind de facto merger, the potential parties and their interests in the transaction must be identified.
The parties' respective rights and their ability to foresee, avoid, or insure against potential damages or imposition of liability must be considered. Further, the relative culpability of each party in the
transaction or the underlying creditor claim must also be consid-

122. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25, 28 (Pa. 1958) (citations omitted).
123. See Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wall v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 602 F.

Supp. 252 (N.D. Tex. 1985); but see Aguirre v. Armstrong World Indus., 901 F.2d 1256

(5th Cir. 1990); Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Castilla v. Trinity Indus., 626 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd).
124. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (West 1984 & Supp. 1996).
125. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.012 (West 1987 & Supp.
1996).
126. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.009 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
127. Id.
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ered. 128 In turn, each of these factors must be weighed to obtain a
proper determination of the legal protection provided each party.
The parties in interest to such transactions are the transferor, the
transferee, and creditors.
Who is a transferor? The obvious answer is that a transferor is the
corporation that formerly owned the assets. This obvious answer,
however, is clouded by the fact that a corporation is a legal fiction.
The real parties in interest are the shareholders who own the stock of
the transferring corporation. Thus, a slightly broader definition of
transferor is needed, including shareholders, directors, and officers of
the transferring corporation, particularly those who were instrumental
in negotiating the transaction, and especially those who become officers and directors of the transferee. Therefore, this author defines a
transferor as any party who may be defined as an insider of the selling
29
corporation under the various statutory definitions of an insider.'
Next, transferees must be defined. As is the case with transferors,
the fictional corporate entity is not the legitimate focus of any policy
analysis because it is a legal fiction, and has no human needs, but
merely serves as a conduit which ultimately serves human needs.
Again, any definition of transferees should include shareholders who
own stock and are thereby financially impacted by any change in the
value of their stock due to imposition of liability for debts. In addition, transferees should include directors, officers, or other individuals
associated with the purchaser who orchestrated the transaction, particularly those who remain in positions of authority and control over
the purchased assets in the combined corporate entity.
Finally, creditors must be defined. Under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act 3° a creditor is defined as "a person, including a spouse,
minor, or ward, who has a claim."'' A claim is defined as "a right to
payment or property, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis1' 32
puted, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.'
Although this definition includes contingent creditors, it will be
demonstrated that the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act from which it
128. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Brown Schs., 757 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. App.-

Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) ("Restitution for money paid under mistake of
fact is simply an equitable limitation that places the loss, as between two innocent
parties, on the one who has created the situation and was in the best position to have
avoided it.").
129. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(7)(B) (West 1987) (under
the Fraudulent Transfer Act an "insider" of a corporation includes: i) a director of the
corporation; ii) an officer of the corporation; iii) a person in control of the corporation; iv) a partnership in which the corporation is a general partner; v) a general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph (iv); and vi) a relative of a general
partner, director, officer, or person in control of the corporation).
130. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.013 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
131. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(4) (West 1987).
132. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (3) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
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is derived133 actually affords contingent creditors little chance for
recovery.

B. De Facto Merger Prevents Disguising Mergers to
Avoid Creditors
Defendants in de facto merger cases have sought to analogize the
imposition of tort liability on successor corporations to an award of
damages against an estate of a deceased wrongdoer, which is prohibited by Texas law.13 4 However, Judge Sanders of the Northern District of Texas rejected this analogy:
A successor corporation is unlike an estate in that the former has
bargained for the assets of its predecessor. It may be, however, that
the assets are encumbered by tort liabilities. The acquiring corporation cannot accept the good without the bad.., and jettison incho35
ate liabilities into a never-never land of transcorporate limbo.'
Judge Sanders' statement highlights the central policy objection to disguising mergers as sale of asset transactions. Jettisoning unwanted liabilities by agreement between a buyer and seller, without agreement
of affected creditors, violates basic notions of fairness as well as basic
principles of contract law.
Any agreement between parties to a sale of asset transaction may
have the practical result of a novation. In transferring rights and duties under a novation, "[t]he assent of the obligee is indispensable."' 36
More importantly, any transfer of assets that incapacitates a transferor's ability to fulfill its obligations, without guaranteeing that an
obligee will receive the perfomance to which he is entitiled, is an obvious injustice, in violation of novation law.
In some cases, the de facto merger doctrine is essential to remedy a
transferor's breach of implied warranties of merchantibility and fitness, or for various other concealed tortious conduct. Without de facto
merger, contingent creditors will be left without the ablility to recover
from transferred assets. Therefore, when transactions bear the essential characteristics of a merger, Texas corporations should not be allowed to disguise merger transactions as a sale of assets transaction
simply to avoid concealed liabilities.

133.
134.
1985).
135.
136.

See infra pp. 619-23.
Wall v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 602 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D. Tex.

Id.
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONTRAcTS 943 (4th ed. 1988). ("When an agreement is made for the substitution of
one obligor for another, such that the obligee is entitled to the same performance, but
the original obligor is released, the agreement is one of a class called 'novation."') Id.
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C. InterpretingArticle 5.10(B) to Preclude De Facto Merger Leads
to Absurd Results
An article 5.10(A) sale of asset transaction presumes an arms length
transaction between a buyer and seller who go their separate ways
after completing the transaction. 137 However, if: 1) the buyer continues the seller's business with essentially the same management and
personnel under the buyer's name, or in the case of a consolidation,
under a new, corporate name; 2) the owners of the buyer exchange
shares of stock with the owners of the seller, and the owners of the
sellers thereby become owners of the buyer; and 3) the seller goes out
of business after the merger, then in reality the companies have
merged despite contractual language to the contrary, and the buyer
assumes those liabilities of the seller that enable the buyer to continue
the seller's business.' 38 De facto merger merely recognizes that the
seller retains a continuing interest in the assets sold, and imposes continuing liability against the assets for debts incurred before the sale.
If a transaction has all the characteristics of a merger defined under
article 5.01,131 there is no harm in deeming the transaction a merger.
In the case of statutory merger or share transfer, the parties agree to
transfer all liabilities along with the assets under article 5.06.140 The
question then arises, did Texas Legislators intend to allow corporate
executives to engage in transactions that have all the characteristics
and benefits of a merger without assuming the liabilities normally associated with a merger? It is beyond reason to infer that Texas Legislators intended to leave the assumption of these debts to the sole
discretion of corporate executives. Surely, the drafters of the Model
Business Corporations Act and the Texas Legislators who adopted the
statute did not intend to create two methods of accomplishing a
merger; one method carrying with it the liabilities of the seller and the
other method imposing no liability.
D. Inadequacy of Fraudulentand Bulk Transfer Law as a Remedy
for Contingent Creditors
To prevent creditor abuse, Texas, like all jurisdictions, has created
or adopted various common law and statutory remedies allowing creditors to seek relief from parties other than the debtor corporation.
These laws and doctrines address intentional as well as unintentional
corporate conduct. The principle statutory remedies available to
these creditors, and those specifically referred to in the extra-textual
material associated with article 5.10(B), 141 are the Uniform Fraudu137. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.10(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
138. Il
139. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.01 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
140. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.06 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).

141.

HOUSE COM. ON BUS. AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYSIS,
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lent Transfer Act 14 2 and the Uniform Commercial Code-Bulk Sales
Act.143 Both Acts allow creditors under limited circumstances to void
transfers and seek in rem relief against the assets transferred or seek
damages against the transferee." However, the Uniform Commercial Code-Bulk Sales Act has45been repealed in Texas and no longer
provides creditor protection.
A creditor may also bring common law or statutory fraud claims for
damages against insiders who improperly transfer assets. However,
due to the fact the corporation, rather than the individual insiders,
owns the assets, remedies against individual insiders will not result in
substantial recovery unless they own other assets sufficient to pay
damages. Where damages are large, individuals held liable will likely
be unable to pay.
1. Fraudulent Transfers
Article 5.10(B) specifically allows the selling corporation's debts to
be imposed on the buyer under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.' 4 6 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act applies when corporate insiders intentionally attempt to evade known creditors by
transferring assets out of a corporation to themselves or to other entities they control. The insiders may then enjoy benefits without encumbrance of previous debts.
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a creditor may seek
relief against a transferee and: 1) avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditors claims; 2) obtain an attachment or other
provisional remedy against the asset transferred; 3) obtain an injunction against any further transfer by the transferee; 4) obtain the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or
other property of the transferee;
5) levy execution of a judgment on
47
the assets transferred.
However, the Act requires proof that: 1) the transferor intentionally sought to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor of the debtor; or 2)
that the transferor made the transfer without receiving reasonably
equivalent value for the assets and was engaged in a business of transaction for which the remaining assets were unreasonably small or intended to incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 48
142. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.013 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
143. Act of June 18, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 721, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 109, re-

pealed by Act of June 11, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 570, § 16, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
2098, 2145 (hereinafter TEX. Bus. & COM.

CODE ANN.

§§ 6.101-.111, repealed by 1993

Tex. Gen. Laws 2098, 2145).
144. See discussion infra pp. 620-23.
145. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.101-.111, repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
2098, 2145.
146. See supra notes 58, 83 and accompanying text.
147. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.008 (West 1987).
148. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
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To prevail in either of these instances, a creditor must prove that the
insiders had knowledge of his claim. One factor courts consider under
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is whether the debtor has been
previously sued or threatened with suit. 1 49 Since contingent creditors
may not even know they have been damaged or have the opportunity
to make a claim until some time after a transfer, it is relatively easy for
a transferor and transferee to deny knowledge of liability.' 50 This is
true even though insiders have substantial reason to know the liabilty
exists. Absent proof of the transferor's or the transferee's knowledge
of liability, it is impossible to prove fraudulent intent. Thus, the fraudulent transfer remedy is generally worthless to contingent creditors.
To preserve a right of relief under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, all potential judgment creditors would have to notify all potential
judgment debtors of their contingent claims in advance of the transfer
of corporate assets and before the claims have matured. This is an
impossible burden to place on tort claim plaintiffs whose causes of
action are latent until an injury occurs or is discovered. Fraudulent
transfer law is therefore an inadequate remedy for many and perhaps
most contingent creditors.
2. Bulk Transfer Has Been Repealed and Can No Longer
Protect Creditors
The sponsors of Article 5.10(B) promised the Legislature that creditors would be protected by bulk transfer law in 5.10(A) transactions. 151 However, the Bulk Transfer Act was repealed in 1993.152
Under the previous statute, bulk transfer was defined as "any transfer
in bulk and not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business of a
major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory
."' Even though it no longer affords protection
of an enterprise ....
149. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(b)(4) (West 1987).
150. See Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.- Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In 1983, Mudgett brought a products liability suit for
injuries he suffered from an industrial machine built by Paxson Machine some twenty
years earlier. It is not uncommon for heavy industrial machines to have long lives.
Paxson sold its assets to an apparently newly created corporation referred to by the
court as Paxson II. Paxson I then changed its name to Thopax. Mudgett tried to sue
Paxson II under a theory of de facto merger. The court granted summary judgment for
Paxson II, interpreting 5.10(B) to preclude de facto merger. Since the summary judgment precluded further development of facts for the record as to whether the traditional de facto merger characteristics were present, it is not known whether Mudgett
would have prevailed on his claims or not. However, the only relevant point to this
part of the discussion is that certain claims can remain latent for extended periods of
time, thus precluding proof of the knowledge and intent element in a fraudulent
transfer claim.
151. HousE COM. ON Bus. AND COMMERCE, BILL ANALYsIs, supra note 86.
152. See supra notes 143, 145 and accompanying text.

153. TEX. Bus. & COM.
2098, 2415.

CODE

ANN. § 6.102, repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
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to creditors, it is nevertheless important to show bulk transfer law
never adequately protected contingent creditors in any event.
The central purpose of bulk transfer law was to provide protection
against two common forms of commercial fraud, namely:
(a) The merchant, owing debts, who sells out his stock in trade to a
friend for less than it is worth, pays his creditors less than he owes
them, and hopes to come back into the business through the back
door some time in the future. (b) The merchant, owing debts, who
sells out his stock in trade to anyone for any price, pockets
the pro54
ceeds, and disappears leaving his creditors unpaid.'
The first form of fraudulent conveyance is addressed under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.155 The second form of fraud suggests a
major bulk sales risk, and its prevention was the central purpose of the
bulk sales law.' 56
Even before its repeal, bulk transfer law applied only to those enterprises whose principle business was the sale of merchandise from
stock, including those that manufactured what they sold.' 57 Thus, a
plaintiff who was injured, for example, by professional malpractice
could not seek relief under bulk transfer law. Further, a plaintiff's
ability to recover from a transferee in a bulk transfer was limited to
those plaintiffs who had known liabilities and who were not notified of
the intended transfer in accordance with the statute. 58 Most importantly, no action or levy against the transferred assets could be
brought more than six months after the transfer date. 159 Such a short
statute of limitations, while adequate to protect creditors who are
aware of their claims, is not realistic to protect contingent creditors
who are damaged by long-lived defective products.
Since contingent creditors frequently have concealed or latent
claims, which remain unknown to both transferors and transferees,
thus precluding the perfection of a bulk transfer claim. The Bulk
Transfer Act, even before 6its repeal, was therefore inadequate to protect contingent creditors.' 1

154. U.C.C. § 6-101 cmt. 2(a), (b).
155. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001-.013 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
156. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.101-.111, repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2098, 2145.

157. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.102(b), repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
2098, 2145.
158. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.107, repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen Laws 2098,
2145.
159. Id. § 6.111.
160. See discussion supra pp. 619-20.
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E. De Facto Merger Does Not Endanger Purchasers in Good Faith
The principle objection to de facto merger is that it seeks to hold
161
one corporation liable for damages caused by another corporation.
Public policy recognizes the need to protect innocent parties who
purchase assets for reasonable value in good faith that the assets actually belong to the seller and are not subject to prior claims. BFPs are
clearly a class the law should and does protect.162 Therefore, any statutory or common law remedy against transferees must avoid unnecessary imposition of unexpected liabilities on BFPs which deprive them
of the benefit of their bargain.
163
However, public policy requires that BFPs prove good faith.
Where insiders of the purchaser are in close relationship with insiders
of the seller, as is always the case in a de facto merger, good faith is
always called into question. If 5.10(B) absolutely precludes proof of
de facto merger, it relieves a successor from the burden of proving
good faith. Furthermore, since notions such as good faith suggest inquiry into a natural person's state of mind, they cannot be easily applied to the fictional corporate person. Examining good faith in sale
of asset transactions, therefore, necessarily involves consideration of
the relationship of the corporate officers, directors, and shareholders
to the assets, both before and after a transfer. Where the officers,
shareholders, and directors of the selling corporation retain a substantial interest in the assets after the transfer, then there is a legitimate
question as to the BFP status of the purchasing corporation. Has the
real person in interest detrimentally changed his position in reliance
on the transaction?' 64 If the real person in interest, through the magic
of corporate formalities, merely stripped the assets from the liabilities
formerly attached to them, it cannot be said that this person detrimentally changed his position with respect to those assets. The person has
obviously beneficially changed his position with respect to those
assets.
At this point, it is helpful to look at the available defenses BFPs
have under the statutes mentioned in the comments to 5.10 B which
expressly allow imposition of liability on transferees. Under fraudulent transfer law, creditors can obtain various forms of relief against
transferees. 65 A transferee, however, may avoid these remedies if the
161. Castilla v. Trinity Indus., 626 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981,
writ dism'd) (rule of strict liability for injuries from defective products should not be
imposed on a party which neither designed, manufactured, nor sold the offending
instrumentality nor had the power to prevent its entry into the stream of commerce).
162. See J.C. Equip., Inc. v. Sky Aviation, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Brown Schs., 757 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
163. J.C. Equip., 498 S.W.2d at 76.
164. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 757 S.W. 2d at 414 ("[T]he doctrine of bona fide
purchaser is grounded on an assumption of change of position.").
165. These remedies are:
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assets are taken in good faith and for fair value. 6 6 In other words, if a
transferee is a BFP, he will not be held liable. In addition, a transferee may recover167the value of any improvements he makes to any
goods transferred.
One objection to de facto merger is similar to the principle objection to the former bulk transfer law: it creates delay and red tape for
legitimate transactions, and presents the possibility of a trap for unwary buyers. 168 However, to minimize the risk of such traps and delays, the subject transactions should be identified as clearly as possible
and limited to those which carry dangers to be guarded against. 169
Under bulk transfer law, sanctions were such as to permit honest and
solvent buyers and sellers to provide for prompt transactions and
without undue risk. 170 Further, bulk transfer law limited actions and
levies on transferred goods to those made within six months of a
transfer.' 7 ' If a transaction was concealed from creditors, any action
72
by creditors had to be brought within six months after discovery.
Similar tailoring could be statutorily applied to relief under the de
facto merger doctrine without eliminating it altogether.
F. De Facto Merger Balances the Rights and Needs of Sellers,
Creditors,and BFPs
The greatest protection a BFP has in application of de facto merger
is that the doctrine never applies to BFPs. BFPs are not affected by
de facto merger since, under proper application of the doctrine, an
arms length purchase of assets with no continuation of relationship
between17 3the insiders of the two corporations is not a de facto

merger.

Moreover, insiders of a transferee who are affected by the doctrine
will by definition have an ongoing relationship with insiders of the
transferor by virtue of their mutual control over the transferee corpo1) avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claims; 2) obtain an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred; 3) obtain
an injunction against any further transfer by the transferee; 4) obtain the appointment
of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or other property of the transferee; and 5) levy execution of a judgment on the assets transferred. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 24.008 (West 1987).
166. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.009 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
167. Id.
168. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.

§ 6.101 cmt. 5, repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen.

Laws 2098, 2145.
169. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
Laws 2098, 2145.

§§ 6.102-.103, repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen.

170. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.104-.108, repealed by 1993 Tex. Gen.

Laws 2098, 2145.

171. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.

§ 6.111, repealedby 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2098,

2145.

172. Id.
173. Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Tex.

Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ration. This ongoing relationship puts insiders in a position to create
effective contractual protection for themselves. However, contingent
creditors are far less likely to have an ongoing relationship with transferees. Their position is weaker than that of the insiders of the transferee for simple reason: they have no opportunity to create
contractual protection during the transaction's negotiation. Public
policy favors protecting those who have less opportunity to protect
themselves.174
De facto merger contains creditor protections similar to those previously provided by bulk transfer law. Further, Article 5.10(B)'s sponsors promised that bulk transfer protection would continue to
apply. 175 Even so, any promised protection was extremely limited and
no longer exists. Allowing de facto merger preserves this promise because it applies not only to the transfer of goods and equipment, but
also to the broader spectrum of business activities. 76 In addition,
both bulk and fraudulent transfer law adequately protected known
creditors, but de facto merger protects contingent creditors as well.
Furthermore, de facto merger does not interfere with the interests
of legitimate sellers who have no intent to avoid creditors. If a corporation liquidates and discontinues business after paying what it can
toward known debts, then the corporation has provided all that can be
reasonably expected within the confines of limited liability principles.
Therefore, creditors, including contingent creditors, are forced to accept the results if all corporate assets have been exhausted and there
is no continuing business from which to generate additional revenue
and assets.
However, this is never the case in a de facto merger. By definition,
in a de facto merger, the original business is continued by another corporation. 77 There must be more than a mere liquidation of assets.
The real owners of the assets retain an interest through their continued ownership of stock and participation in the affairs of the transferee.' 78 This continuing interest allows insiders of a transferor to
continue enjoying the flow of revenue from the enterprise. It is therefore fair to ask these insiders to pay contingent liabilities out of future
revenues generated from the continuing enterprise.
Furthermore, contingent creditors, typically judgment creditors who
meet the burden of proof for their claim, may or may not receive
more than would have been received if the transaction was deemed a
de facto merger.' 79 Absent a merger, judgment creditors could levy
the assets of the would-be seller. Therefore, there is no windfall to
174. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 757 S.W.2d at 414.

175. See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
176. See discussion infra pp. 623-24.
177. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d at 786.
178. Id.

179. Id.
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creditors if their claims follow the transaction. However, de facto
mergers may create deeper pockets for creditors; for example, creditors might recover more than if their recovery was limited to the assets of the selling corporation. However, this small risk of creditor
windfall does not outweigh the gross injustice of no recovery. To do
otherwise allows sellers to escape liability through the magic of corporate formalities, which can easily be structured for the primary purpose of defeating legitimate claims.
CONCLUSION

The plain language of Article 5.10(B) states no more than the general common law rule that a purchaser of assets does not become liable for the debts of the seller.'8 0 The extra-textual evidence clearly
suggests the Texas Legislature passed Article 5.10(B) in an overabundance of caution to clarify the intent of article 5.10(A)."' The de
facto merger doctrine, properly applied, should never apply to a mere
sale of assets under Article 5.10(A) of the Texas Business Corporations Act. Evidence demonstrates this was accomplished under the
mistaken belief that Gerhardtheld a transaction under article 5.10(A)
was a de facto merger.' 2
Based on the Bar Committee Comments accompanying the statute,
courts and commentators interpreting 5.10(B) have exceeded legislative intent. Under these flawed interpretations, contingent creditors
are now deprived of their right to recover judgments from corporate
assets. Additionally, statutes such as the Fraudulent Transfer Act are
clearly inadequate to protect contingent creditor rights. De facto
merger, however, balances the rights of sellers, creditors, and BFPs.
Under the de facto merger doctrine, contingent creditors obtain no
windfall; they simply retain the right to seek relief from corporate assets, as they would have had the merger not occurred.
Further, BFPs should never be subject to application of the de facto
merger doctrine. De facto merger does not apply unless a BFP has a
continuing relationship with a seller who has become part of the
BFP's corporation. This is logical since both sellers and BFPs are in a
better position to foresee and insure against contingent liabilities than
are contingent creditors.
Given these considerations, the Texas Legislature should codify a de
facto merger statute. This statute should set forth the elements from
8 3
Gerhardt required to determine a transaction a de facto merger.
Further, the statute should include elements of bulk transfer law to
180. Id.

181. See discussion infra pp. 602-09.
182. Tape of Senate Subcomm. on Civil Matters, supra note 60.
183. Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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minimize delays and red tape for legitimate transactions. 1" Only by
accomplishing this can creditors, transferors, and transferees be
protected.
Frank William McIntyre

184. See supra notes 168-172 and accompanying text.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

35

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 2 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 7

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol2/iss3/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V2.I3.6

36

